The $165M Gambia-Sinohydro paper plant 

The national energy company, NAWEC, signs an agreement with Chinese state-owned engineering giant Sinohydro Corporation to boost country’s energy generation capacity. The project never moved beyond this table. Source: The Point newspaper

In February 2017, President Adama Barrow took his vows in front of a packed Independence Stadium amid a wave of immense national optimism. Barely ten months later, disillusioned citizens, under the banner #OccupyWestfield, took to the streets to protest severe, prolonged electricity blackouts and water shortages. The state utility provider, the National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC), was already drowning in its historic struggle to provide basic power, crippling local businesses and households alike.

Sandwiched between that historic inauguration and the late 2017 street protests was what promised to be the savior of the Gambian grid. NAWEC had just signed a heavily publicized energy agreement with Chinese state-owned engineering giant Sinohydro Corporation. The deal promised a complete overhaul of the country’s electricity infrastructure: a massive 62MW Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) power plant in the Greater Banjul Area and a transmission backbone line designed to anchor The Gambia into regional energy grids.

Nine years later, the megadeal exists only on paper. As Gambians once again endured catastrophic daily power outages in September 2026, no construction has ever taken place. No financial audits show where the preliminary allocations went, and no official announcement has ever clarified whether the line of credit was canceled, suspended, or quietly buried.

Deal of the two eras begins here

The roots of the deal trace back to March 2016, a pivotal turning point for Gambia-China relations. A three-day conclave at the Kairaba Beach Hotel between the Ministry of Energy and Sinohydro Corporation—a core subsidiary of PowerChina—foreshadowed a tectonic shift in foreign policy. A week later, Gambian Foreign Minister Neneh Macdouall-Gaye and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi signed a joint communiquė in Beijing, officially re-establishing bilateral ties after a 21-year rupture. Former President Yahya Jammeh had cut ties with Beijing in 1995 to recognize Taiwan, before abruptly reversing course and severing ties with Taiwan in 2013.

However, internal NAWEC documents uncover a deeper timeline: the Jammeh administration was dealing with Beijing long before ties were normalized. On July 13, 2015, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy signed the initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Sinohydro. Internal documents acknowledge this was done “in anticipation of re-establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries,” proving infrastructure deals were being used as diplomatic currency before the public ever knew.

By March 2017, with Jammeh exiled and a new democratic government in place, technical teams met again to finalize the energy roadmap. On April 21, 2017, the Barrow administration enthusiastically picked up where the previous regime left off.

To signal what they termed a “revolution” in Gambian energy, the hotel signing ceremony featured Liu Xiaomin, Sinohydro’s regional general manager for West and Central Africa; Fafa Sanyang, Gambia’s Minister of Energy; and the Managing Director of NAWEC, Baba Fatajo. The utility leadership publicly hailed the deal at the time as an absolute “game-changer.” Yet, while the $50–million Chinese-built Conference Centre smoothly galloped to completion, the power plant evaporated.

Source: The Point

The $165M illusion: Loan, MoU, or EPC?

A central mystery of the Sinohydro deal lies in its legal and financial architecture. While international development tracker AidData categorized the 2017 framework as a formal loan pledge, The Republic’s analysis of the actual contract signed by Lui Xiaomin on behalf of Sinohydro and the leadership of NAWEC reveals a starkly different reality. This was not a financial loan agreement executed by banks. It was a commercial Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract locked at a precise price of USD165,628,710.40. 

The facts in the agreement appear to show that The Gambia signed a contract to build a power plant without ever securing the money to pay for it. The document executed by NAWEC and Sinohydro was not a financial credit agreement, but a strict commercial EPC contract. 

In the contract, the deal was explicitly conditional on NAWEC subsequently securing external financing. By signing a technical agreement locked at $165.6 million without a concurrent, binding loan from a bank, the Barrow administration celebrated a project that was contractually hollow from day one.

Despite this apparent lapse in judgement, perhaps influenced by the desperate financial state of the national energy company at the time, exacerbated by high national debt and decaying energy infrastructure, the small West African country went on to prepare tax exemptions and duty waivers for a contract they are yet to secure money to finance. 

Frenzy of unsolicited proposals

A series of audits of the national energy company has shown a history of executive interference in its procurement, and inundation of unsolicited proposals often from people with political backing. Alpha Robinson, one of the recently sacked managing directors of the company, left this advice for his successor in his handing over note.

“It is apparently a common practice for potential investors to seek some sort of agreement with NAWEC to help them raise funds,” Robinson wrote.

“Some of the potential investors I have met, and I lost count in the end, were very bullish. One group went as far as telling me that the President was planning to issue a statement on that day and me signing an agreement was a prerequisite.”  

Robinson called his bluff. It would appear such an approach was a luxury for NAWEC officials back then. 

One senior manager of the utility company, intimately involved in the 2017 negotiations with Sinohydro, described to The Republic an atmosphere akin to one laid bare in Robinson’s handing over note. NAWEC, he said, was operating in a chaotic environment, besieged by foreign firms looking to capitalize on the blackout crisis.

“I cannot remember all the minor details now, as it was almost a decade ago,” the source stated, noting that the project entered NAWEC’s purview through irregular, unsolicited channels. 

“… At the time we also received numerous unsolicited offers and there was a lot of distraction.”

While Sinohydro was aggressively leveraging the newly normalized diplomatic ties to secure the $165.6 million contract, a long list of global power companies and speculative developers was simultaneously overloading NAWEC with unsolicited proposals. 

Among those circling the grid were global fast-power rental giants like Aggreko and APR Energy; Turkish IPP heavyweight Aksa Energy; infrastructure investors Aldwych; Indian engineering firm Mohan Energy Corporation (MEC); alongside developers like ACG, ACE, Kinesis Energy, and Novi Energy.

To make way outside of this chaos, the national utility provider had to work on an energy roadmap that “spelled out our expansion plan”.  “Anything outside that was not entertained,” said a senior official of NAWEC. 

Lack of due diligence pushes western financiers away

The contract’s Particular Conditions reveal exactly why the project remained dead on arrival, protecting Sinohydro from deploying any assets until cash was delivered.

The contract states that the agreement would only enter into full force and effect once “The Employer [NAWEC] has secured the necessary financing.” 

The senior utility source corroborated this specific failure point. “I think there were conditions that the government couldn’t fulfill. I think one of them was a sovereign guarantee… should NAWEC default, the government will step in to take its financial obligations.” 

Sinohydro was under no legal obligation to turn a single shovel of dirt until NAWEC disbursed 30% advance payment as an interest-free loan for mobilization and design. This required upfront cash injection amounted to $49. 6 million. 

The internal NAWEC documents show that the generation component was designed as a heavy-duty HFO infrastructure network to stabilize the Greater Banjul Area, matched with 18.5km of 132Kv transmission lines running from Brikama to New Wellingara, and another 11km link connecting to Kotu. But without the opening capital injection, this robust layout never moved past the planning phase.

The former official also exposed a massive backend roadblock that explains why Western institutions wouldn’t touch the deal. “The financiers then would always request competitive bidding, and in this case, the recruitment was to be single-sourcing.” 

The contract required a specific “waiver for single sourcing” from the Government of The Gambia. This single-source structure immediately alienated major international development partners. 

As one anonymous source noted, “the country was in debt distress and hence the development partners frowned at commercial borrowing.” Faced with losing the backing of the World Bank and the IMF due to unsustainable commercial debt, the Barrow administration was forced to shut on Sinohydro. 

This transition culminated in May 2018 when the World Bank officially approved the Gambia Electricity Restoration and Modernization Project (GERMP). Backed by co-financing from the European Union (EU) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), the total package was valued between $141 million and $165 million—nearly identical in cost to the abandoned Sinohydro deal, but completely green and tightly regulated. 

Rhetoric vs. reality

 At the highly publicized April 2017 signing ceremony, Minister of Petroleum and Energy Fafa Sanyang painted a picture of what the megadeal would achieve. Sanyang enthusiastically declared that if the $165.6 million project was successfully implemented, it would have “wide-ranging effects on the economy,” promising that a stable and affordable power supply would trigger widespread employment creation, poverty alleviation, and localized industrial growth. 

 Yet, behind this political rhetoric, the Ministry and NAWEC leadership had signed a document that bound the Chinese engineering giant to absolutely nothing while leaving the Gambian state utility empty-handed. The signing of the project does add colours to Sanyang’s Wikipedia page, where the project is recorded as one of the landmark deals of his ministerial career which ended in May 2022. 

When the international financial guarantees failed to materialize, what followed was silence. Sanyang, who had transitioned from a jailed Jammeh-era civil servant to Barrow’s chosen Energy Minister in April 2017, managed the fallout of the stalled project until a cabinet reshuffle.

Rather than facing public questioning regarding why a headline $165.6 million contract yielded zero megawatts of power, Fafa Sanyang was appointed as The Gambia’s Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 

When formally contacted for comments on the failed project, Ambassador Sanyang’s office issued a defense that appears to contradict publicly known facts about the proposed project.

“The Sinohydro agreement was intended to be an EPC project. However, no loan agreement or contract was signed, and the project could not be pursued due to funding related issues,” Sanyang’s office stated.

By claiming no contract was ever signed, the former minister directly contradicts the physical commercial EPC document executed by NAWEC’s leadership and Sinohydro’s Regional Manager.

 “For further details regarding the agreement, you may wish to follow-up with the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MOPE), particularly the Department of Energy, which will be better placed to provide more information on this matter,” Sanyang said. 

The missing paper trail 

Nearly a decade later, NAWEC’s operations continue to stagger under the structural weight of these historic failures. When formally asked regarding the legacy of the unfulfilled contract and the missing records of the 2017 deal, the utility’s leadership could not immediately find the paperwork.

In an official response to an Access to Information (ATI) request dated 12th October 2026, NAWEC Managing Director Mr. Gallo Saidy acknowledged receipt of the inquiry but admitted that the utility is still hunting for its own files. 

Saidy stated that “internal enquiries are ongoing to establish the availability and location of the historical records” across relevant departments, citing the “age of the project” as the primary reason for the delay, raising questions over transparency and record-keeping continuity of the utility provider. 

Lopsided sovereign liabilities

Had the project moved forward, the draft shows that NAWEC had signed onto a lopsided liabilities that heavily favored Sinohydro.

Sinohydro secured complete exemption from all Gambian taxes, including VAT, corporate income tax, customs duties, withholding tax, and individual income tax for foreign staff. If the Gambian government failed to grant these exemptions, the contract forced NAWEC to pay those taxes out of its own budget on top of the $165.6 million price tag.

The Gambia was contractually mandated to hand over all borrow areas, quarries, and transmission line access points completely free of charge. The contract also pushed 100% of the financial burden for land acquisition, citizen resettlement, and property displacement compensation onto NAWEC.

If NAWEC experienced an operational delay in certifying or paying an invoice, Sinohydro was legally entitled to hit the utility with an interest penalty calculated at the 6-month LIBOR rate + 3% compounded per day, which means Nawec would end up paying interest on top of interest, exponentially increasing the penalty for every day the invoice sat unpaid. 

The contract designated the London International Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom as the exclusive seat of international arbitration, pricing out NAWEC from realistic local legal recourse.

Sino’s was bad… not the worst 

With the collapse of the Sinohydro deal, amidst widespread protests arising from blackouts, NAWEC was forced to go for shortcuts to mask its decades of failure. 

This void was filled by a floating Turkish energy company, Karpowership, which signed a Power Purchase Agreement to supply 30MW of power into the national grid. The details of this contract remained hidden from the public throughout its life, despite an ATI request from The Republic, requesting a copy. NAWEC only reacted to our request by summarising the details of the contract in their own words, contrary to the provisions of the Access to Information Act 2021.  

This rental solution quickly evolved into a massive financial drain for an energy company that was already struggling with debt and surviving on handouts from the Central Government. In its first three years alone, the Karpowership arrangement cost the country roughly $88 million—already over half of the entire Sinohydro capital requirement. 

By the time the contract concluded in May 2025, cumulative payments to the Turkish firm reached $200 million, far exceeding the one-time $165 million price tag of the Chinese proposal.

A Gambian economist, associated with the Unite political movement — Ousman Gajigo— said the money spent on Karpowership alone is sufficient to buy the country a 200 megawatts power plant. 

Meanwhile, the Karpowership deal left the country with only half the capacity compared to the 62MW plant proposed by Sinohydro, leaving NAWEC with no generating assets after the contract ended.

The Ministry of Petroleum, Energy and Mines failed to respond to The Republic’s ATI request. The Republic has also tried unsuccessfully to reach Sinohydro with several emails to the corporation’s parent company PowerChina and its West and Central Africa office. 

This report is published with funding support from the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) under the Critical Coverage of Africa-China Relations in West Africa project.

 

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